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I. INTRODUCTION 
For years, academics from a variety of disciplines have set forth a 
rich literature asserting that judges’ policy preferences, rather than 
adhesion to neutral legal principles, determine legal results in close 
cases.1 Much of this writing, referred to here as “Judicial Political 
Realism,”2 relies upon empirical studies, which show that a judge’s 
 
* Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. I am deeply indebted to Gregory 
Goldman for his research assistance. I would also like to thank Don Hornstein, Joe Kalo, Ernie 
Young, Eric Segall, John Orth, Victor Flatt, Richard Myers, Melissa Jacoby, Scott Baker, and 
Al Brophy for their helpful ideas and comments. 
 1. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 7 (2008). See generally JEFFREY A. 
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) 
(applying an attitudinal model to examine the decisions and decision-making processes of the 
Supreme Court); James L. Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory 
in the Study of Judicial Behavior, 5 POL. BEHAV. 7 (1983) (discussing the development of 
theories of judicial behavior); Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public 
and Academic Debates about Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743 (2005) (presenting 
empirical accounts of judicial behavior); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006) (analyzing empirical research 
on judicial behavior). 
 2. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 
831, 834–35 (2008). Sunstein and Miles appear to use the term “New Legal Realism” to apply 
generally to the entire field of empirical literature that seeks to ascribe the results in judicial 
decisions to factors other than the dispassionate application of legal principles and doctrine. In 
this paper, I will use the term Judicial Political Realism as referring to the literature that 
describes judicial decision-making as based on the personal political preferences of the judges. I 
use the term to incorporate both the studies that explain judicial decisions as directly reflecting 
the political preferences of the judges (i.e., a judge will vote to vindicate abortion rights if she is 
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ideology (usually determined by referencing the political party of the 
judge’s appointing president3) significantly explains patterns of 
judicial votes.4 Some studies take these results and conclude that 
law—in terms of legal rules and doctrine—is largely irrelevant. Other 
studies assert that law may constrain decision making, but only 
partially, and even then a judge’s reliance on law may be better 
explained as strategic decision-making that takes into account 
institutional limitations and possible political backlash5 in order to 
allow the judge to effectuate her policy preferences over the long 
term rather than in only the immediate case before her.6 In either 
case, the thrust of these studies is to depict judges as political actors 
promoting their own policy goals, rather than as dispassionate 
decision-makers neutrally reaching results in cases based upon the 
dictates of legal rules, doctrine, and reasoning. 
Not surprisingly, the practicing bar, judges, and (most) legal 
academics generally have not warmly received the Judicial Political 
Realist literature. Most lawyers like to believe that legal rules, legal 
doctrine, and legal reasoning matter even in close cases. They think 
that there are good legal arguments and bad legal arguments and that 
the strength of the argument pushes the judge one way or another in 
choosing among plausible outcomes. Most judges, in turn, do not like 
to view themselves as merely political actors akin to state legislators. 
They like to see their actions as guided by high legal principle rather 
than by base political preference. Most legal academics, of which I am 
one, would prefer not to tell our students that when they argue their 
first case in court, they might as well only stand up and say, “Your 
Honor, this is a close case and since you are going to do whatever you 
want anyway based upon your normative inclinations, I will just sit 
down.” 
 
pro-choice) and studies that suggest a judge may pursue a political agenda by strategically 
voting against his political preference in a given case in order to effectuate his political agenda 
over the long term. 
 3. The party of the appointing president is only one of a number of measures of ideology 
that has been used in this literature and, in fact, what should be the appropriate measure is very 
much disputed. See id. at 836 n.23 and cited authorities therein. 
 4. See id. at 831. 
 5. See generally Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch 
Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POLS. 
1018 (2004) (contending that public opinion, including fears of public backlash, affects judicial 
decision-making). 
 6. See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) 
(contending that judges will sometimes sacrifice short-term policy goals in favor of long-term 
results). 
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The implication that judges are only political actors effectuating 
their own policy preferences is enormous. To quote Judge Richard 
Posner, “[i]f changing judges changes law, it is not even clear what law 
is.”7 Further, if there is no “law” external from the judges’ preferences, 
it is not clear why judges (many of whom are not elected) should have 
their particular political agendas trump those of other political actors. 
Where does a court’s legitimacy come from if not from its role in 
upholding the Rule of Law? Furthermore, if legal decisions primarily 
rest on a judge’s preexisting preferences, then what is the meaning or 
purpose of legal rules, doctrine, or reasoning? 
The resistance of the legal profession to the challenges posed by 
the Judicial Political Realists is therefore understandable. Even 
beyond believing that rules of law make a difference,8 the legal 
profession has a vested interest in seeing the role of the judiciary as 
one of “call[ing] balls and strikes,” in the words of Chief Justice 
Roberts,9 and not as one of advancing its own political agenda with 
little internal constraint. It has a similar interest in asserting that rules, 
doctrine, and reasoning matter. If not, the enterprise of lawyering is 
merely a charade. 
Against this background, it is interesting to note two recent 
United States Supreme Court cases in which the Court, or at least 
some of its Justices, appears to allow the notion that judges are 
political actors to infiltrate constitutional doctrine. In the first, 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,10 the Court ruled that a state 
could not prohibit candidates for judicial office from announcing their 
views on issues that might come before them.11 For First Amendment 
purposes, judicial candidates are to be treated no differently than 
legislative candidates; the voters are entitled to know the candidates’ 
views on the issues and they are expected to support or oppose a 
candidate on that basis.12 The implicit suggestion in White mirrors the 
 
 7. POSNER, supra note 1, at 1. 
 8. See Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology Versus Character, 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 659, 689 (2004) (“[I]deological struggle . . . makes nonideological judging necessary to 
realize the rule of law.”); Lawrence B. Solum, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian 
Guide to Judicial Selection, 61 S. CAL. L. Rev. 1735, 1741–51 (1988) (contending that judges can 
decide cases without inserting nonlegal policy considerations into their decision making). 
 9. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of 
the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of 
John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee for Chief Justice of U.S. Supreme Court). 
 10. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 11. Id. at 788. 
 12. Id. at 781–82. 
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judges-as-political-actors critique—judges, like legislators, bring 
political agendas to their service. 
In the second case, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection,13 four Justices, in an opinion 
authored by Justice Scalia, argued that the Court should recognize a 
doctrine of “judicial takings”—meaning that a change in property 
rights resulting from a judicial opinion entitles the aggrieved property 
owner to the same sort of compensation that a property owner would 
receive if the change to her rights occurred as a result of legislative 
enactment.14 To these Justices, there was no constitutional difference 
between judicial and legislative action for the purposes of the Takings 
Clause.15 Even more graphically than in White, the judicial takings 
theory advanced in Stop the Beach Renourishment sets forth the 
vision of judges as political actors. Judicial decisions are not to be 
treated as interpretations of law but as exercises of raw political 
power akin to legislative enactments. 
The Court in neither White nor Stop the Beach Renourishment 
stopped to address the view of judges as political actors inherent in 
their opinions. This paper does so. After first canvassing the specifics 
of both the White and Stop the Beach Renourishment opinions, it 
discusses what these cases say about the nature of judging and judicial 
institutions. 
Part II sets forth the necessary background. It discusses the 
Judicial Political Realist model of judging and shows how this model 
contrasts with the traditional account of legal decision-making, which 
sees the judicial obligation as adherence to the Rule of Law. Part III 
discusses the White and Stop the Beach Renourishment decisions and 
demonstrates how both opinions reflect the Judicial Political Realist 
 
 13. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 
(2010). 
 14. Id. at 2601–02. Justice Scalia advocated in favor of recognizing a judicial takings 
doctrine in Parts II and III of his opinion, in which he was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Thomas and Alito. The remaining Justices concurred in the judgment and joined Parts 
I, IV, and V of the opinion, but did not believe that the constitutionality of judicial takings 
should be decided in the case at bar because there was clearly no taking (and thus the question 
of just compensation need not be resolved). See, e.g., id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he plurality unnecessarily addresses questions of 
constitutional law that are better left for another day.”). Justice Kennedy’s opinion also 
expressed serious reservations as to whether a doctrine of judicial takings should ever be 
recognized. See id. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 15. Id. at 2602 (“If a legislature or a court declares that what was once an established right 
of private property no longer exists, it has taken that property . . . .”). 
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account. Part IV inquires why the Justices in White and Stop the Beach 
Renourishment proceeded as they did. Part V then discusses the 
negative implications for judicial institutions inherent in the doctrinal 
acceptance of the Judicial Political Realist model. Part VI then offers 
a brief conclusion. 
Before proceeding, two taxonomical notes are in order. First, the 
paper uses the term “Judicial Political Realist” to refer only to those 
accounts which suggest that a judge’s political preferences guide legal 
decisions, whether in the short term (the “attitudinalist” model)16 or in 
the long term (the strategic model).17 In so doing, it omits reference to 
critiques suggesting that gender or other such factors are 
determinative in legal decision-making.18 Second, unless otherwise 
indicated, any reference to Stop the Beach Renourishment refers to 
the opinion authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito. 
Finally, I should reemphasize that I am not asserting that the 
Justices signing on to the White or Stop the Beach Renourishment 
opinions explicitly or intentionally adopted the Judicial Political 
Realist model. Rather, I contend that both cases are substantial 
moves towards the incorporation of the model of judges as political 
actors into constitutional doctrine and both cases therefore raise the 
institutional concerns associated with that account. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In popular perception, judges decide (or should decide) cases by 
strict adherence to the Rule of Law. While not precisely defined, this 
proposition appears to be divided into two subcomponents. The first is 
that judges have a duty to decide cases according to external, neutral 
principles. The second is that judges should not allow personal beliefs 
or philosophy to influence their decisions. 
 
 16. See sources cited supra note 2. 
 17. See, e.g., McGuire & Stimson, supra note 5; EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 6; Frank B. 
Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 
NW. U. L. REV. 1437 (2001) (discussing the institutional context of judicial behavior); WALTER 
F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964) (discussing judicial power to shape 
public policy). 
 18. See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal 
Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010) (dissecting the effects of gender on 
judicial decision-making); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for 
the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 
OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (2004) (concluding that judges’ religious beliefs can affect judicial decision-
making). 
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The belief that judges have a duty to decide cases in accordance 
with the Rule of Law is deeply ingrained in our political culture and 
has considerable political resonance. Critics of controversial judicial 
decisions, for example, strive to delegitimize the opinions with which 
they disagree by attacking the deciding judge or judges as acting 
outside the Rule of Law—sometimes characterizing the judge or 
judges’ actions as “legislating from the bench”19 or suggesting that the 
judge or judges engaged in “judicial activism.”20 These attacks, 
moreover, are not limited to condemning decided cases, but are also 
used in political discourse to generate resistance to an opposing 
party’s judicial nominees.21 Thus, both Republicans and Democrats 
commonly criticize each other as insufficiently committed to the Rule 
of Law and as having the intent to nominate judicial “activists” who 
will only further the party’s political agenda.22 This Rule of Law 
rhetoric continues throughout the nominations process as virtually 
every nominee to the federal bench solemnly declares that she will 
never let her personal views influence her judicial decision-making, 
knowing full well that if she were to say something different her 
nomination would self-destruct.23 
 
 19. Viet D. Dinh, Threats to Judicial Independence, Real and Imagined, 95 GEO. L.J. 929, 
940 (2007). 
 20. Id. at 938. 
 21. See Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology Versus Character, supra note 8, at 664 (quoting 
Senator Charles Schumer’s New York Times essay regarding opposition to judicial nominees on 
ideological grounds); Dinh, supra note 19, at 935–37 (discussing political criticisms of the 
judiciary). 
 22. For example, in response to the Supreme Court seat vacated by Justice Souter, 
Republican Senator Orrin Hatch, the ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
spoke to President Obama, urging him “not to nominate a ‘judicial activist’” and to “‘choose a 
nominee who . . . would uphold the rule of law.’” Alexander Mooney, Hatch to Obama: No 
Judicial Activist, CNN.COM POLITICAL TICKER (May 4, 2009, 9:01 PM), http://politicalticker.blo 
gs.cnn.com/2009/05/04/hatch-to-obama-no-judicial-activist. Along similar lines, the nomination 
of Justice Alito caused a stir among Democrats who saw Alito as an advocate of the far-right 
wing of American politics. Peter Baker, Alito Nomination Sets Stage for Ideological Battle: 
Bush’s Court Pick is Appeals Judge With Record of Conservative Rulings, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 
2005, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/10/31/AR2 
005103100180.html. 
 23. The most recent high-profile nominee to adopt this stance during her confirmation 
hearings was Justice Elena Kagan. Elena Kagan, N.Y. TIMES (updated Oct. 4, 2010), http://topic 
s.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/k/kagan_elena/index.html?scp=1&sq=kagan%2
0confirmation%20hearings&st=cse. Ironically, in a 1995 article, then-Professor Kagan 
advocated for a more rigorous confirmation process for judicial nominees by calling for a 
“meaningful discussion of legal issues,” and criticizing the confirmation hearings of Justices 
Breyer and Ginsburg as “official lovefests.” Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 920 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: 
CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1995)). See William P. Marshall, 
Constitutional Law as Political Spoils, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 525, 534 n.45 (2005) (providing 
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The popular perception that judges are bound by an externally 
imposed rule of law also has a long-standing counterpart in legal 
theory. It is called Legal Formalism24 and for much of our history it 
dominated the legal theory debate.25 To Formalists, law is 
deterministic, meaning that there are “right” legal decisions dictated 
by a correct application of the relevant legal principles. Judges may 
make mistakes in deciding cases, but Formalism suggests that judges 
correctly applying the appropriate rules to a given case should reach 
the same legal result. 
Interestingly, however, although popular culture continues to 
subscribe to the notion of the inviolability of the Rule of Law, 
Formalism has been under siege by legal theorists in the United 
States since at least the 1870s.26 Today, as Professor Frederick Schauer 
notes, there are probably very few legal theorists, if any, who continue 
to accept the Formalist claim in its original form.27 
The reason for Formalism’s demise was a devastating attack 
brought on by the so-called Legal Realist School. Led by such 
scholars as Jerome Frank28 and Karl Llewellyn,29 Legal Realists argued 
that law was not externally based, but rather derived from the 
institutions empowered to decide cases. To the Realists, law was 
indeterminate and judges’ decisions depended as much on context as 
upon strict application of rules of law.30 Justice Holmes’s statement 
 
other examples of Supreme Court nominees declining to address political views during 
confirmation hearings). 
 24. FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 29–35 (2009) [hereinafter 
SCHAUER]; See generally Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (discussing 
legal formalism). The notion that judges are constrained by an externally imposed rule of law 
has also been referred to as “legalism.” POSNER, supra note 1, at 41. 
 25. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731, 731 (2009) 
(“‘Until the twentieth century, most lawyers and scholars believed that judging was a 
mechanistic enterprise in which judges applied the law and rendered decisions without recourse 
to their own ideological or policy preferences . . . .’” (quoting VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, 
STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 30 
(2006))). 
 26. At least one scholar suggests that the rejection of Formalism may have begun 
contemporaneously with its rise. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST 
DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 29–33 (2010). 
 27. See SCHAUER, supra note 24, at 125. 
 28. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) (setting forth the Realist 
account of judicial decision-making). 
 29. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930) 
(setting forth the Realist account of judicial decision-making); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism 
About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931) (same). 
 30. SCHAUER, supra note 24, at 128. 
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that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience”31 
is probably the most famous summary of this position. 
Notably, the Legal Realist position challenged only the notion that 
law was externally derived. The Realists did not speak to the question 
of whether law was “political” in the policy-pursuing sense of the 
term, nor did they address whether law was merely a function of the 
political positions of the judges who decide cases.32 Those concepts 
had yet to be crystallized. Their focus was instead on the development 
of law as a whole and not the individual preferences of sitting judges. 
The idea that law is essentially political was far more central to 
the work of the Critical Legal Studies movement.33 But like the Legal 
Realists, the Critical Legal Theorist account was systemic rather than 
individualistic. They saw law as a manifestation of the political 
dominance of entrenched power structures,34 meaning that the law, 
taken as a whole, should be understood as favoring the interests of 
already politically dominant groups over the rights of the 
disenfranchised and marginalized.35 Like the Legal Realists before 
them, the Critical Legal Theorists did not address whether law was 
merely the political preferences of the deciding judges.36 That next 
step was to be the mission of the Judicial Political Realists. 
Interestingly, the Judicial Political Realist account began in 
earnest outside the realm of legal theory, in the province of political 
science. Judicial Political Realism, moreover, unlike Legal Realism 
and Critical Legal Studies, based its critique upon empirical study and 
not on theory. Specifically, the political scientist Harold Spaeth 
tracked judicial votes in ideologically laden cases and, measuring 
those results against the perceived ideology of the judge, found 
empirical support for the proposition that judges decide cases in 
accord with their ideological values rather than by the application of 
legal rules and doctrine.37 He referred to this method of judicial 
 
 31. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
 32. See Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the Issue?, 16 LEGAL 
THEORY 111, 119 (2010) (“But it was not the thesis of the Realists that judges decided in 
accordance ‘with their political views’!”(citation omitted)). 
 33. See id. at 118 n.36 (discussing the Critical Legal Studies movement); John Hasnas, Back 
to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the 
Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 DUKE L.J. 84, 97 (1995). 
 34. SCHAUER, supra note 24, at 146; Hasnas, supra note 33, at 97. 
 35. See Hasnas, supra note 33, at 97 (stating that judges’ preservation of social hierarchies 
is veiled by the Rule of Law concept). 
 36. Leiter, supra note 32, at 188 n.36. 
 37. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 65. 
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decision-making as “attitudinalist.”38 Later writers have since added to 
(or modified) Spaeth’s attitudinal model by demonstrating that a 
judge’s willingness to vote in accord with her ideological 
predispositions may be affected by institutional incentives, and that a 
judge may strategically vote in a particular case in order to achieve 
ideological vindication over the long term.39 Nonetheless, Spaeth’s 
overall premise, that judges decide cases based on preexisting 
preferences, rather than by objective applications of legal doctrine, 
remains essentially in place.40 
The empirical accounts of Spaeth and others, studying how judges 
actually behave, were for many years largely ignored by the legal 
community. As Judge Posner wrote, “[t]hese theories are expounded 
in a rich literature ignored by most academic lawyers . . . and by 
virtually all judges.”41 
More recently, however, legal academics have begun to take 
notice.42 Further, the Judicial Political Realist model has received 
reinforcement from another source as well—the United States Senate, 
or at least some United States Senators opposing a particular 
President’s judicial nominee. Asserting that a judge’s preexisting 
philosophies can influence her decision making, these Senators have 
begun inquiring into judicial philosophy in confirmation hearings 
even as the nominees’ stock answer—that they will not let their 
personal beliefs affect their judicial decision-making—remains exactly 
the same.43 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. See generally McGuire & Stimson, supra note 5; EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 6; 
Cross & Nelson, supra note 17; MURPHY, supra note 17. 
 40. Perhaps even more empirically established than Spaeth’s view—that judges are 
primarily motivated by their preexisting ideology when deciding cases—is the assertion that, 
when deciding cases, judges are motivated by factors other than legal doctrine. See Theodore W. 
Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to 
Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1155 (showing by an 
empirical study of the Supreme Court’s 2002 Term that a forecasting machine that is 
“indifferent to specific doctrine and text” can predict the results in Supreme Court cases better 
than doctrinal experts). 
 41. POSNER, supra note 1, at 7. 
 42. See generally, Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications 
of Judicial Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 856 (2008) 
(discussing the implication of empirical scholarship for doctrinal analysis); Frank B. Cross, 
Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 
92 NW. U. L. REV. 251 (1997) (discussing the relationship between traditional legal scholarship 
and empirical studies of judicial behavior). 
 43. See, e.g., Charles E. Schumer, Op-Ed., Judging By Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2001, 
at A19, available at http://schumer.senate.gov/about_chuck/op-ed_ideology.html (arguing for a 
“return to a more open and rational debate about ideology when [senators] consider 
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Law itself has remained largely unaffected by the Judicial Political 
Realist attack.44 Lawyers argue cases as if doctrine matters and judges 
decide cases by citing text, precedent, and history and never intimate 
that personal ideology rather than legal principle guides their 
decision. Legal academics—other than those specifically examining 
judicial behavior—continue to analyze law in its own terms and not 
relative to the judges deciding the cases. The criticism that a judge has 
inserted her political beliefs into a judicial decision, rather than 
adhering to the Rule of Law, still resonates as a powerful 
condemnation of that judge’s actions. It is neither intended, nor taken, 
as accepting the proposition that an expected part of the judicial 
function is that a judge will insert her political preferences into law.45 
Part IV, below, discusses why this may be so. For the moment, 
however, it is worth discussing two Supreme Court cases, Republican 
Party of Minnesota v. White and Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. 
Florida Department of Environmental Protection, in which the 
account of judges as political actors appears to have made inroads 
into judicial doctrine. 
III. DOCTRINAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE MODEL OF THE JUDGE AS 
POLITICAL ACTOR 
A. Judicial Speech and Republican Party of Minnesota v. White 
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,46 Gregory Wersal, a 
candidate for the position of Associate Justice of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, challenged the constitutionality of a Minnesota 
Canon of Judicial Conduct providing that a candidate for judicial 
office could not “announce his or her views on disputed legal or 
political issues.”47 Under this Canon, for example, a candidate could 
not declare her views on such matters as abortion, capital punishment, 
criminal sentencing, or tort reform without incurring the risk of 
 
nominees”). 
 44. To be sure, there have been some doctrines adopted by courts that are designed to 
lessen the chances that judges’ policy preferences might affect their decisions. See Chevron, 
U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), discussed infra notes 102–06 and accompanying text. 
 45. Notably, even leading empirical scholars such as Mitu Gulati and Stephen Choi 
evaluate a judge’s independence from others in her political party as an attribute of judicial 
excellence. Mitu Gulati & Stephen Choi, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An 
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004). 
 46. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 47. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CANON 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000). 
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ethical sanction. Claiming that this provision prevented him from 
campaigning on, or even mentioning, his views on controversial issues, 
Wersal alleged that Minnesota’s judicial canon violated his rights 
under the First Amendment.48 
In a 5–4 decision, the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion 
written by Justice Scalia, agreed with the plaintiff.49 The Court first 
held that because speech relating to a candidate’s qualification lies at 
the core of the First Amendment,50 the Minnesota Canon could be 
upheld only if it was “narrowly tailored, to serve a compelling 
governmental interest.”51 After then finding that the state’s asserted 
interests of promoting judicial impartiality and the appearance of 
judicial impartiality were not sufficiently compelling, the Court ruled 
that the provision was unconstitutional.52 
The Court’s decision in White was not unexpected. The Court was 
exactly on point in noting the critical importance of freedom of 
speech to political campaigns for elected office. Indeed, to some First 
Amendment theorists, the raison d’être for protecting freedom of 
speech is its role in fostering self-government.53 There is no speech 
more directed at this purpose than speech designed to help voters 
make informed decisions. Furthermore, in White itself there was no 
doubt that the judicial canon in question severely restricted the ability 
of judicial candidates to reach out to their constituencies. 
What is more significant about White for our purposes, though, are 
the justifications about the nature of judicial decision-making that the 
Court offered in defense of its holding. The State argued that the 
Canon promoted judicial impartiality because a candidate who had 
not taken a position on a controversial issue would be more open to 
 
 48. The Minnesota Republican Party and others parties joined Wersal as plaintiffs in the 
case, contending that their First Amendment rights were violated because the Canon’s 
restrictions meant they were denied sufficient information from which they could determine 
whether to support Wersal’s candidacy. White, 536 U.S. at 770. 
 49. Id. at 788. 
 50. Id. at 774; see also Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271–72 (1971) (“And if it 
be conceded that the First Amendment was ‘fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange of 
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people,’ then it can 
hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application 
precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.”). 
 51. White, 536 U.S. at 775. 
 52. Id. at 776. 
 53. The self-governance rationale is most closely associated with the writings of Alexander 
Meiklejohn. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT, 15–16, 24–27, 39 (1948). See also Harry Kalvin, The New York Times Case: A 
note on the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1960). 
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ruling on either side of that issue should it come before her as judge. 
A candidate who had taken a position on an issue, in contrast, would 
be more likely to rule on the side of the issue on which they had 
campaigned. The Court, however, viewed the type of impartiality that 
the state could permissibly promote far more narrowly, seeing it only 
as a “lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding.”54 To 
the Court, an impartial judge was not one without predispositions to 
vote in certain ways on certain issues; rather, it meant only that the 
judge was not biased against a particular party in a particular 
proceeding.55 Thus, a judge who as a candidate may have expressed 
her views on how an issue should be decided would still be considered 
impartial. As the Court stated: 
[W]hen a case arises that turns on a legal issue on which the judge 
(as a candidate) had taken a particular stand, the party taking the 
opposite stand is likely to lose. But not because of any bias against 
that party, or favoritism toward the other party. Any party taking 
that position is just as likely to lose. The judge is applying the law 
(as he sees it) evenhandedly.56 
Notably, the foregoing passage is by itself significant in setting the 
stage of a Judicial Political Realist account of judicial decision-
making. It explicitly rests on the proposition that a judge is likely to 
bring preexisting views to her legal decisions. But the Court did not 
stop there. To the White Court, eliminating a judge’s preconceptions is 
unattainable: 
For one thing, it is virtually impossible to find a judge who does 
not have preconceptions about the law. As then-Justice Rehnquist 
observed of our own Court: “Since most Justices come to this 
bench no earlier than their middle years, it would be unusual if 
they had not by that time formulated at least some tentative 
notions that would influence them in their interpretation of the 
sweeping clauses of the Constitution and their interaction with one 
another. It would be not merely unusual, but extraordinary, if they 
had not at least given opinions as to constitutional issues in their 
previous legal careers.”57 
 
 54. White, 536 U.S. at 775. 
 55. Id. at 776. 
 56. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 57. Id. at 777–78 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (memorandum 
opinion)). Indeed, the Court went on to suggest that finding a judge without preexisting views 
would not even be desirable. Again citing Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court stated: “Proof that 
a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of 
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To be sure, White need not be read as embracing a Judicial 
Political Realist account. It could be viewed as standing only for the 
more modest proposition that judicial candidates have preexisting 
opinions on legal issues and that the interests of an informed 
electorate should allow a judicial candidate to communicate those 
views to her constituency. White, however, is not so easily constrained. 
After all, White also struck down Minnesota’s provision prohibiting 
judicial candidates from announcing their political views.58 By holding 
that judicial candidates can campaign for votes on the basis of their 
political positions, the opinion suggests that judicial decisions, like 
legislative decisions, are appropriately products of political choice. In 
that sense, White normalizes the view that judicial decisions may be 
based on political preference and not rules of law. A decision on the 
constitutionality of gun control, for example, is determined not on the 
basis of what the Constitution means, but on whether a state’s 
electorate has elected pro-gun or pro-gun control jurists. 
Of course, White’s apparent acceptance of the Judicial Political 
Realist account might be defended on grounds that the insertion of 
politics in judicial decision-making necessarily follows from any legal 
system that elects judges. Under this view, White should not be 
extrapolated to apply to the Court’s view on the enterprise of judicial 
decision-making generally. It only applies to decision making by 
elected judges. Perhaps. But the fact that a state elects its judges does 
not mean that it has endorsed, or even acquiesced in, the view that 
rules of law should be politically determined. The states that utilize 
elections as their method of judicial selection did not adopt that 
system for this reason. Rather, the primary reasons animating the 
broad movement by the states to a system of judicial elections59 were 
 
constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias.” Id. 
(quoting Laird, 409 U.S. at 835). 
 58. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CANON 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000). The Court’s 
decision protecting the right of judicial candidates to campaign on their political views also 
suggests that the Court believes those views are relevant to how judges decide cases. Why, after 
all, would an informed electorate need to know if a judge was pro-life or pro-choice if those 
political dispositions were irrelevant to the judge’s decision making? 
 59. The key time period in which this movement took place was 1846–1860. See 
Christopher Rapp, Note, The Will of the People, the Independence of the Judiciary, and Free 
Speech in Judicial Elections after Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 21 J.L. & POL. 103, 
107 (2005). Mississippi actually predated this trend and became the first state to call for the 
election of all state judges in 1832. Vermont, Georgia, and Indiana, meanwhile, elected trial-
court judges at the local level in the early 1800s. See MATTHEW J. STREB, RUNNING FOR JUDGE: 
THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 9 (2007). 
Electing judges was also not unknown at the time of the ratification of the Constitution. 
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general notions of Jacksonian democracy and concerns for protecting 
the independence of judges.60 The purpose of these measures was not 
to allow voters to pick and choose the meaning of legal rules.61 
Moreover, the states have continued to reject the notion that judicial 
elections should be seen as vehicles for placing rules of law up for 
political referenda. That is why Minnesota’s judicial canon (and those 
of other states) prohibited judges from campaigning on their political 
views. The notion, in short, that political preferences should determine 
legal rules of decision does not inevitably flow from the nature of 
judicial elections. It does, however, flow directly from White. 
B. Judicial Takings and Stop the Beach Renourishment 
The recognition of the doctrine of “judicial takings” in Justice 
Scalia’s opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment is, in many ways, 
even more significant jurisprudentially in its acceptance of the 
Judicial Political Realist model than is the Court’s opinion in White. 
White used the Judicial Political Realist model only as part of its 
justification for rejecting the State’s argument in favor of curbing a 
judicial candidate’s speech rights. The implicit message in Justice 
Scalia’s recognition of judicial takings in Stop the Beach 
 
Vermont’s 1777 Constitution, in force until Vermont became a state in 1791, called for the 
popular election of some lower-court judges. VT. CONST. of 1777 § 27. 
 60. See Rapp, supra note 59, at 9 (attributing the states’ move to judicial elections as part of 
the wave of Jacksonian democracy). As Streb writes, “the rise of Jacksonian democracy gave 
more power to the people and raised questions about the accountability of judges. Not electing 
state judges was considered to be undemocratic, and the Jacksonian era was dominated by 
beliefs in expanded suffrage and popular control of elected officials.” Id. 
 Other scholars suggest that the reasons underlying the states’ adoption of judicial elections 
were more complex. See Caleb Nelson, Note, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the 
Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 190–92 (1993). 
That is, the delegates from various states not only discussed the desirability of judicial elections 
in terms of democratic populism or judicial independence, but also raised a number of other 
issues. To Nelson, “the arguments on both sides were sophisticated . . . . Most delegates clearly 
had more in mind than merely applying the democratic principle.” Id. at 192. Nelson asserts that 
the real underlying force that led to judicial elections was an overall suspicion of government. 
Nelson, supra, at 203. He writes: 
The rise of the elective judiciary marked not a mere transfer of power from one branch of 
government to another, but an effort to decrease official power as a whole. It arose from the 
people's profound distrust of their own government, whose officials could not be counted upon 
to act in the citizenry's best interests. Id. 
 61. To be sure, as Kermit Hall explains, there were some who supported judicial elections 
who were concerned with judicial activism and who believed that elections could help curb 
judicial overreaching. See Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform 
and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846–1860, 45 HISTORIAN 337, 348 (1983). But, as Hall 
maintains, the primary support for judicial elections was to preserve judicial independence and 
not to undercut it. Id at 342–43. 
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Renourishment, however, goes much further and suggests that 
substantive rules of constitutional law need to be refashioned in light 
of the Judicial Political Realist account. Before we get to this point, 
however, it is necessary to provide some background to the 
underlying takings issue. 
1. The Takings Clause 
The Takings Clause provides that no “private property [shall] be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”62 As its text 
indicates, the Takings Clause does not prohibit the government’s 
seizure of property for public use, but only requires the government 
to provide compensation in the event that it does so.63 Its underlying 
rationale, as the Court has explained, is not to prevent the 
government from acting in the public interest, but to assure that the 
government does not force “some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.”64 Significantly, although the Takings Clause is most 
commonly associated with eminent-domain proceedings65—where the 
government seizes an owner’s property, permanently or temporarily, 
for public purpose66—a takings claim, known as a “regulatory taking,” 
can arise when a government’s regulatory action is “so onerous that 
its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster.”67 
2. Judicial Takings 
The theory of “judicial takings” is that the protections of the 
Takings Clause should also apply to the decisions of the judicial 
branch. Under such a doctrine, property owners whose rights are 
 
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 63. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 314 (1987). 
 64. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Monongahela Navigation 
Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893) (“[The Takings Clause] prevents the public from 
loading upon one individual more than his just share of the burdens of government.”). 
 65. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2601 (2010) (“[T]he classic taking is a transfer of property to the State or another private party 
by eminent domain . . . .”). 
 66. See generally, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (holding that 
the government’s seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike of coal 
miners constituted a taking). 
 67. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 528 (2005). As the Lingle Court noted, the 
test for when regulatory takings should be recognized, first set forth by Justice Holmes in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), is rather enigmatic: “‘[W]hile property 
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.’” 
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548 (quoting Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415). 
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sufficiently adversely affected by a judicial decision are entitled to 
compensation just as much as property owners whose rights are 
adversely affected by an executive or legislative branch decision. As 
Professor Barton Thompson explains, the theory of judicial takings 
rests in exactly this symmetry, and he offers the following example in 
support: 
Under the traditional common law rule, owners of beachfront 
property hold title down to the mean high tide line. If the 
executive or legislative branch of a state government were to order 
private beachfront owners to permit the public onto the portion of 
their beaches between the mean high tide line and the vegetation 
line, without compensation, the United States Supreme Court 
would almost certainly hold that the state had taken the 
beachowners’ property in violation of the Constitution. If, on the 
other hand, a state court were to reject the traditional common law 
rule, overrule its prior decisions, and hold that private owners 
exercise dominion only to the vegetation line, this might not be 
considered an unconstitutional taking. The immediate 
consequence to the beachowners, however, is identical: in both 
cases, they have lost the exclusive right to a portion of what they 
justifiably had thought was their beach.68 
Although some courts have recognized the principle of judicial 
takings,69 the United States Supreme Court has never formally 
accepted the doctrine.70 Indeed, a few of its decisions indicate that 
Takings Clause protections do not apply to judicial decisions.71 That 
issue, however, was placed squarely before the Court this past term in 
Stop the Beach Renourishment.72 
 
 68. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1450 (1990). 
 69. See, e.g., Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473, 482–83 (D. Haw. 1978) 
(holding that the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision violated the Fifth Amendment’s takings 
protections); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Haw. 1975) (finding that a Hawaii 
Supreme Court decision that converted private water rights to public water rights was a taking). 
 70. The roots of the doctrine in the United States Supreme Court can be traced, however, 
to Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967) 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“Of course the [Washington Supreme Court] did not conceive of this 
action as a taking. . . . But the Constitution measures a taking of property not by what a State 
says, or by what it intends, but by what it does.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364–66 (1932); 
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680–81 (1930). For an excellent, 
thorough analysis and chronology of the judicial takings concept, see Thompson, supra note 68, 
at 1463–72. 
 72. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597 
(2010) (“We consider a claim that the decision of a State's court of last resort took property 
without just compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
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3. Stop the Beach Renourishment 
Stop the Beach Renourishment presented the Court with a judicial 
takings claim by a group of beachfront property owners in an area of 
Florida that had suffered serious beach erosion. In response to this 
erosion, the owners’ communities sought to engage in a beach 
restoration project that would fill in land by inserting sand deposits 
between the edge of owners’ property and the water. By Florida 
statute, the beach created as a result of the new sand deposits would 
belong to the state,73 meaning that the property owners’ land would 
no longer touch the water74 even though they would not lose any 
actual acreage. Further, the owners would also not have the right to 
take ownership through the common-law property right of accretion 
to land created by any natural expansion of the beach, a right they 
would have enjoyed had their property continued to abut the water.75 
Contending that this loss of land touching the water and the loss 
of their rights of accretion constituted a taking,76 the owners 
challenged the project in the Florida state courts. The case eventually 
reached the Florida State Supreme Court, which ultimately rejected 
the owners’ claims, holding that Florida property law did not protect 
the owners’ asserted property interests.77 The property owners then 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, asserting that the 
decision of the Florida Supreme Court changed preexisting Florida 
law and was therefore itself a taking.78 
The United State Supreme Court in an 8–0 decision79 found for 
the State with all the participating Justices agreeing that the Florida 
Supreme Court decision did not violate the owners’ constitutional 
rights. The Justices differed, however, as to whether the Court should 
 
 73. Id. at 2599. 
 74. Florida law did provide that the landowners would continue to have the right of access 
to the water over the state-owned lands. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 2600. Because no land of the property owners was actually seized under the 
project, the owners’ claim in Stop the Beach Renourishment was in the nature of a regulatory 
taking. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that “while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking”). 
 77. See Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 
2008). 
 78. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2600–01. As noted in the Court’s 
opinion, although the Supreme Court of Florida did not address the question that was presented 
in the petition for writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court granted certiorari because the decision 
of the state court itself was challenged as violating federal law. Id. at 2600 n.4. 
 79. Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision. 
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recognize a judicial takings doctrine. Justice Breyer, writing for 
himself and Justice Ginsberg, contended that the Court should not 
reach the question in Stop the Beach Renourishment because the facts 
so clearly indicated that no taking of any kind had occurred.80 Thus, 
they concluded that it would be better to preserve the recognition 
issue for a later date.81 Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and Justice 
Sotomayor, agreed that the Court should not reach the issue under 
the facts before them, but Justice Kennedy’s opinion also expressed 
serious reservations about whether the Court should ever recognize 
the doctrine.82 In Justice Kennedy’s view, the remedy for any judicial 
decision that improperly invaded the property owners’ rights should 
be found in the Due Process Clause and not the Takings Clause.83 
The critical opinion for our purposes, however, was authored by 
Justice Scalia. Although holding that the property owners were unable 
to demonstrate that there was a judicial taking under the facts in Stop 
the Beach Renourishment itself,84 Justice Scalia’s opinion, joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, asserted that a 
judicial takings doctrine should be recognized.85 To Justice Scalia, “[i]t 
would be absurd to allow a State to do by judicial decree what the 
Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat.”86 
 
 80. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(explaining that a judicial takings doctrine would effectively sanction the right of courts to take 
property from state residents without holding these courts to the same fiscal and political 
constraints applicable to regulatory agencies). 
 83. See id. at 2614–15 (“If a judicial decision, as opposed to an act of the executive or the 
legislature, eliminates an established property right, the judgment could be set aside as a 
deprivation of property without due process of law.”). 
 84. See id. at 2613. According to Justice Scalia, a judicial takings claimant, in order to 
successfully maintain a judicial takings claim, must show that the challenged judicial decision 
amounted to an “elimination of an established property right.” Id. at 2608. Justice Scalia ruled, 
however, that the property owners in Stop the Beach Renourishment were unable to meet this 
standard because Florida property law was not sufficiently settled in their favor. See Id. at 2610–
13. 
 85. See id. at 2601 (“Our precedents provide no support for the proposition that takings 
effected by the judicial branch are entitled to special treatment, and in fact suggest the 
contrary.”). 
 86. Id. Justice Scalia also defended recognition of the doctrine on textual grounds. 
Specifically, he argued that the text of the Takings Clause, unlike other constitutional provisions 
such as the Ex Post Facto Clauses, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 and U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1, 
does not mention a specific branch of government. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 
2601. Justice Scalia asserts, “[t]here is no textual justification for saying that the existence or the 
scope of a State's power to expropriate private property without just compensation varies 
according to the branch of government effecting the expropriation.” Id. 
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Justice Scalia’s opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment marks a 
stark example of Judicial Political Realism in action. To begin with, 
Justice Scalia’s express equation of a taking by judicial decree and a 
taking by legislative fiat is a direct endorsement of the notion that 
judicial decision-making is indistinguishable from legislative action. 
To Justice Scalia, a judicial decision that upsets an owner’s settled 
property interests is a political one, not a legal one. His rhetorical 
move of ascribing both judicial and legislative action to the “State”87 
only reinforces this proposition. Justice Scalia’s diminishment of the 
role of law in the Florida Supreme Court’s decision could not be 
clearer. 
The significance of equating legislative takings with judicial 
decisions affecting property rights is even more remarkable given the 
classically legislative nature of a takings action.88 As discussed above, a 
legislative taking occurs when the government appropriates property 
for public purpose. In such circumstances, the Takings Clause protects 
the property owner by requiring the government to pay for the 
appropriation. A government deciding whether to “take” property for 
a public purpose is then faced with the policy calculus of determining 
whether the benefit of the proposed action is worth the cost of its 
funding,89 both in relation to the value of the project itself and in 
relation to the other funding priorities facing the government at that 
particular moment. This type of calculus, as the Court noted in a 
 
 Actually, there may be such a reason. As Justice Scalia later acknowledges in his Stop the 
Beach Renourishment opinion, the Framers likely did not believe that courts had the power to 
“change” common law. Id. at 2606 (“[T]he Constitution was adopted in an era when courts had 
no power to ‘change’ the common law.” (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69–
70 (1765); Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 472–78 (Scalia, J., dissenting))). But if the Framers 
did not believe that courts could change law, as Justice Scalia argues, there would have been no 
reason for them to include the courts in the anti-takings provision. If, after all, the courts cannot 
change the law, they cannot not effectuate a judicial taking, which, by definition, requires a 
change in the law. Justice Scalia does not deny this point, rather his response is only a textualist 
argument that when constitutional text is clear, the interpretive question “is not what [the 
Framers] envisioned but what they wrote.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2606. Of 
course, even in his textualist assertion, Justice Scalia is not on solid ground, as the Taking 
Clause  does not  mention the courts. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory 
Takings, and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379, 433–34 (2001). As Walston argues, the 
ability to effectuate a taking derives from the exercise of the police power, a power enumerated 
to the legislative branch (and importantly, not to the judiciary). A taking “involves an inherently 
legislative function, not a judicial one.” Id. 
 89. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2613–14 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that some states allow their officials to reconsider 
whether to effectuate a taking after a jury verdict sets the amount of compensation). 
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previous case, is inherently legislative.90 
A court weighing property rights, in contrast, would neither 
inquire about, nor have the necessary information to evaluate, the 
political wisdom of a forced purchase or how that cost should relate 
to other funding priorities. A court presumably would ask an entirely 
different set of questions: Does preexisting precedent support the 
property claim? Is the claim based on common-law principles? What 
are the potential precedential effects in recognizing (or not 
recognizing) a property right in this instance? Will the types of policy 
considerations that have traditionally justified doctrinal changes in 
the law support this decision (if the decision does indeed depart from 
existing precedent)? Justice Scalia’s depiction of the judicial decision 
as legislative, however, suggests that even if a court reached a 
conclusion on the allocation of property rights based upon these sorts 
of legal considerations, its judgment should still be considered a 
political, and not a legal, decision. 
Finally, depicting a judicial property rights decision as a taking 
furthers the Judicial Political Realist notion that judges are political 
actors in yet another way. Certainly, a court in any given case can 
decide an issue in a manner that improperly undercuts the settled 
rights of property owners. If it did so, however, one would expect the 
decision to be criticized as “wrong” as a matter of law. But this is 
where characterizing the court’s action as a taking becomes so 
significant. Because takings jurisprudence presumes that the state has 
the legitimate power to take private property for public purpose 
(subject to a compensation requirement), a judicial takings theory 
must also presume that a court has the legitimate power to take 
private property (subject to compensation).91 This means even the 
most egregious decision by a court invading private property rights 
for public use can never initially be criticized as “wrong” or even 
unconstitutional; it can only be described as requiring compensation.92 
 
 90. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (“[T]he power of eminent domain is a legislative function.”). As 
Roderick Walston notes, also indicating that the takings power is not judicial is the fact that it 
stems from the police power, a power a court does not have. See Walston, supra note 88, at 433–
34 (“The courts, unlike legislatures, do not exercise the police power; rather, they exercise solely 
an interpretive function.”). 
 91. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 92. For this reason, Justice Kennedy’s argument—that judicial decisions improperly 
affecting property rights should be analyzed under the Due Process Clause—makes far better 
sense. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. See also Walston, supra note 88, at 433–38 
(arguing that because judicial decisions are a result of different institutional functions than are 
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It becomes unconstitutional only if the required compensation is not 
forthcoming.93 Justice Scalia’s equation of judicial decrees to 
legislative fiats thus suggests that there are no legal bounds to a 
judicial decision, there is only political calculus—a conclusion that 
could come straight from the Judicial Political Realist account. 
IV. WHITE, STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, AND THE EFFORT 
TO CONSTRAIN JUDICIAL POWER 
White and Stop the Beach Renourishment did not have to be 
reasoned as they were. Even if the Justices joining those decisions 
believed that Minnesota’s judicial canon was unconstitutional or that 
property owners needed to be constitutionally protected from judicial 
decisions that upset settled expectations, there were other options. In 
White, for example, the Court’s opinion itself offered an alternative 
justification for striking down the challenged provision—specifically 
that the provision was “woefully underinclusive” in accomplishing the 
state’s purposes because it affected only what a candidate could say 
after declaring to run and not what she may have stated up until she 
announced her candidacy.94 The opinion did not need to assert that all 
judges have preconceived views that necessarily affect judicial 
decision-making in order to reach its result.95 
Similarly, in Stop the Beach Renourishment, those supporting the 
view that property owners need to be protected from errant judicial 
decisions could have relied on Justice Kennedy’s view that any 
improper judicial invasion of settled property rights could be 
 
legislative decisions, they should be seen as bound by the Due Process Clause and not the 
Takings Clause). 
 93. A taking that is not for public use, of course, could be ruled unconstitutional on that 
ground. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 467, 477 (2005); Haw. Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229, 245 (1984). 
 94. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 779–80 (2002) (“The short of the 
matter is this: In Minnesota, a candidate for judicial office may not say ‘I think it is 
constitutional for the legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages.’ He may say the very same 
thing, however, up until the very day before he declares himself a candidate, and may say it 
repeatedly (until litigation is pending) after he is elected. As a means of pursuing the objective 
of open-mindedness that respondents now articulate, the announce clause is so woefully 
underinclusive as to render belief in that purpose a challenge to the credulous.”). 
 95. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion also provided another possible ground for 
decision; i.e., that it was the problem of electing judges, and not what judicial candidates might 
say on the campaign trail, that created the actual risk of judicial bias and therefore any bias 
issues rested with Minnesota’s method of judicial selection and not its ethical canons. Id. at 788–
92 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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overturned under a due process challenge96—a view far more 
consistent with the proposition that courts are bound by legal rules 
than is Justice Scalia’s judicial takings characterization of court 
decisions as akin to legislative actions. Why, then, did the White and 
Stop the Beach Renourishment opinions proceed as they did and 
seemingly adopt the view of the judge as political actor? 
To be sure, it could be argued that the Supreme Court’s doctrinal 
recognition of the proposition that law is not derived from external, 
objective sources is nothing new. In 1938, in one of its most notable 
cases, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,97 the Court decided that the 
federal courts had to look to state common law rather than federal 
common law in deciding non-statutory claims. Prior to Erie, the 
federal courts had relied on their own interpretations of the “general” 
common law in deciding such cases based on the premise that, 
regardless of forum, the common law derived from a universal 
source.98 The Erie Court ruled, however, that because law could no 
longer be considered to be derived from a “transcendental body of 
law outside of any particular state,”99 displacing state common law 
with federal common law offended principles of federalism and 
exceeded the federal courts’ power. 
But while Erie might (and should) be considered a Legal Realist 
decision, it was not a Judicial Political Realist decision in the sense of 
suggesting that state and federal judges were acting to further their 
own political preferences. Erie suggested that both statutory and 
common law were positivistic—that is, that law did not derive from 
external sources. Erie said nothing about the reasons why a court 
might decide as it did and did not question the motivations or 
dispassion of the rendering court.100 The implication in Stop the Beach 
 
 96. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2614–15 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (“The Court would be on strong footing in ruling that a 
judicial decision that eliminates or substantially changes established property rights, which are a 
legitimate expectation of the owner, is ‘arbitrary or irrational’ under the Due Process Clause.” 
(emphasis added) (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005))) . 
 97. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 98. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 19 (1842) (“And we have not now the slightest difficulty 
in holding, that [the Rules of Decision Act], upon its true intendment and construction, is 
strictly limited to local statutes and local usages of the character before stated, and does not 
extend to contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature, the true interpretation and 
effect whereof are to be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general 
principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence.”). 
 99. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79. 
 100. Some scholars have suggested that Erie was concerned with curbing undue policy 
making by the federal courts. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary 
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Renourishment and White, in contrast, is that judicial decisions are 
vehicles designed to accomplish political purpose. White explicitly 
holds that judges may campaign to further political agendas. 
Subjecting judicial property-law decisions to a takings analysis, as in 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, implies that those property-law 
decisions are predicated upon the rendering court’s desire to pursue a 
certain public policy course and not upon its dispassionate 
interpretation of the law. Neither of these propositions can be 
assigned to Erie.101 
It could also be argued that White and Stop the Beach 
Renourishment are rooted in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.102 In Chevron, the Court held that courts must 
defer to federal agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes and, 
critically for our purposes, based this decision in part on the desire to 
prevent judges from inserting their “personal policy preferences” into 
statutory interpretation.103 But, while the clear implication of Chevron 
is the unremarkable proposition that judges can insert their political 
preferences into their decision, Chevron, unlike White, does not 
suggest that they will inevitably do so.104 Indeed, by assigning to courts 
the initial determination of whether a statute is ambiguous, Chevron 
appears to presume that judges are fully able to avoid deciding at 
least some issues by political preference.105 Nor does Chevron suggest, 
 
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 815 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law, and the 
Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007). But see Craig Green, Repressing 
Erie’s Myth, 96 CAL. L. REV. 595, 596–99 (2008) (refuting this contention). 
 101. In this respect it is notable that neither White nor Stop the Beach Renourishment cites 
the Erie decision. For the argument that Erie does lead to the recognition of the doctrine of 
judicial takings see W. David Sarratt, Note, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 1487, 1531 (2004). 
 102. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 103. Id. at 865. 
 104. Nonetheless, there is significant literature arguing that despite Chevron’s stated goal of 
avoiding judicial policy-making, the two-step framework has actually increased the effect of a 
judge’s policy preferences. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make 
Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825–26 
(2006); Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 68–83 (1994); William S. Jordan, III, Deference Revisited: Politics as a 
Determinant of Deference Doctrine and the End of the Apparent Chevron Consensus, 68 NEB. L. 
REV. 454, 486–90 (1989); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and 
Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1068–72 
(1995). But see Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron 
Doctrine in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 15 YALE J. REG. 1, 48 (1998) (arguing that the effect of 
personal policy preferences on judicial decision-making is no more pronounced under Chevron 
than under pre-Chevron understandings). 
 105. The Chevron analysis proceeds in two steps. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. The first 
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like Stop the Beach Renourishment, that it is permissible for courts to 
make pure policy. Rather, Chevron is a case designed to limit the 
exercise of judicial policy-making, not license it.106 
So why, to repeat the question, would the Justices who joined 
White and Justice Scalia’s opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment 
go beyond precedent and choose to frame the issues before them in a 
way that diminishes the role of law as a guiding force in judicial 
decision-making? It is one thing, after all, for those on the outside to 
contend that judges are essentially only political actors; it is another 
when that message comes from the United States Supreme Court 
itself.107 
Two possible reasons emerge. First, the Justices may have thought 
that the Judicial Political Realist account is accurate. As discussed 
above,108 many social scientists accept this view and the proposition 
enjoys substantial empirical support.109 The White and Stop the Beach 
Renourishment opinions then might just be judicial attempts to 
reconcile the legal system with the Judicial Political Realist account.110 
Ascribing the Judicial Political Realist mantle to the specific 
Justices joining White and the Justice Scalia opinion in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, however, seems mistaken. As Judge Posner noted, the 
theory that law binds judges “remains the judiciary’s ‘official’ theory 
of judicial behavior” and it is one that has been “proclaimed most 
emphatically by Justices of the Supreme Court.”111 There seems little 
 
requires the Court to apply its interpretation of the federal statute if the statutory language is 
clear. Id. at 842–43. The first part of Chevron assumes that judges can make legal decisions 
without being influenced by personal preferences. Chevron’s required deference only applies in 
the second step—when the statutory language is unclear and policy considerations serve as a tie-
breaker between competing statutory interpretations. Id. at 843. 
 106. The argument that White and Stop the Beach Renourishment are also designed to check 
against judicial overreaching will be discussed below. See infra notes 115–16 and accompanying 
text. 
 107. See supra Part III. 
 108. See supra Parts I and II. 
 109. See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text. 
 110. A multitude of legal scholars have attempted such a reconciliation by advocating for 
reform. See, e.g., John Ferejohn, The Law of Politics: Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 66–67 (2002) (calling for the reform of confirmation rules to 
lessen the effects of politics on the judiciary); David A Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, 
the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1494 (1992) (arguing that to 
reduce the politics of judicial confirmations, the Senate should take a stronger role); Thomas J. 
Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 784–
91 (2008) (proposing that all appellate panels should have at least one judge from each of the 
two major political parties). 
 111. POSNER, supra note 1, at 41. 
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reason to suspect that the Court’s most conservative Justices would 
veer from this “official” account. Justice Scalia, moreover, who wrote 
both White and Stop the Beach Renourishment, has been a tireless 
critic of those judges whom he believes insert their political 
preferences into law.112 He has also vigorously and continually 
asserted that politics should not determine the results in cases and 
does not determine results, at least when he is the decision maker.113 
The second, and more likely, explanation is that the decisions in 
White and Stop the Beach Renourishment can be seen as part of the 
efforts by the Court’s conservative wing to combat perceived judicial 
overreaching by other judges. Viewed in this way, the message is clear. 
If judges are acting politically, they should be held accountable 
politically. 
Without doubt, the Court’s decision in White and the recognition 
of a doctrine of judicial takings in Stop the Beach Renourishment 
directly promote judicial accountability. In White that accountability 
takes place in the ballot box,114 as the sitting judges will have to 
answer to the voters for their “political” decisions. In Stop the Beach 
Renourishment the accountability takes place by forcing the state to 
bear the costs of its courts’ political choices.115 
But if that is the strategy in White and Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, it is risky business because the logic of those decisions 
impugns all judicial decision-making, not just those decisions that 
certain Justices on the Court perceive as overreaching. The premise 
that judicial decisions inevitably reflect political bias does not allow 
 
 112. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Since the 
Constitution of the United States says nothing about this subject, it is left to be resolved by 
normal democratic means, including the democratic adoption of provisions in state 
constitutions. This Court has no business imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored 
by the elite class from which the Members of this institution are selected . . . .”). 
 113. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1186–87 (1989). 
 114. See Michael Richard Dimino, Sr., Counter-Majoritarian Power and Judges’ Political 
Speech, 58 FLA. L. REV. 53, 55–56 (2008) (arguing that White was aimed at making the state 
courts more responsive to popular input because the White majority was concerned that the 
state courts had overused their independence to stray too far from majoritarian preferences). 
 115. Justice Scalia’s Stop the Beach Renourishment opinion was also clearly designed to 
prevent state courts from doing an end run around the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v. 
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), a case in which the Court held that the 
determination of whether a legislative action affecting property rights constituted a taking 
depended upon the owners’ settled property expectations. Notably, the Court in Lucas explicitly 
forewarned that it would police state-court common-law decisions to assure they did not alter 
the background law to avoid a takings finding. Id. at 1032 n.18. Perhaps not surprisingly, Justice 
Scalia also authored the Lucas decision. 
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for exception and does not exclude Justices sitting on the United 
States Supreme Court. If lower-court decisions are inevitably political, 
the same must be said of the decisions of the Supreme Court—
including those Supreme Court decisions that characterize the lower-
court decisions as being improperly political. According to the Judicial 
Political Realist account, Supreme Court decisions that react to the 
perceived political overreaching of the lower courts are no more than 
political judgments themselves. 
Consider how this understanding might play out in a takings case. 
Assume that a state supreme court rules that its decision adversely 
affecting a plaintiff’s property rights is not a taking. Further assume 
that the United States Supreme Court disagrees and would find the 
state-court decision to be a taking. If all judicial decision-making is 
politically based, the Supreme Court decision is on no firmer ground 
than the state-court decision because both are based upon the 
deciding judges’ political views. There is no obvious legal justification 
as to why the United States Supreme Court should replace a state 
court’s political determination of whether a particular action 
constitutes a taking with a contrary political determination of its own. 
The decisions of both courts, under this theory, are only political 
actions. 
It might, of course, be contended that a state-court common-law 
decision is not functionally equivalent to a Supreme Court’s 
constitutional decision because common law is based upon constantly 
changing policy determinations while constitutional law is defined by 
fixed principles. But this contention is descriptively inaccurate. Even 
Justice Scalia acknowledges that the rules of constitutional law 
change.116 Alternatively, it might be argued that a state court’s 
common-law decision is not functionally equivalent to a Supreme 
Court’s constitutional-law decision because the former is a policy 
choice while the latter is an apolitical interpretation of law. But if, as 
White seems to suggest, judicial decisions inevitably reflect judge’s 
predispositions, no particular judicial decision can be characterized as 
a purely legal interpretation. 
Still another response might be to contend that, at least with 
respect to the recognition of a judicial takings doctrine, the 
characterization of either the state or Supreme Court opinion as 
 
 116. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784; see also Teague v. Lane, 489 
U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (acknowledging that the Court makes “new rules” of criminal procedure). 
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political is beside the point. The focus, rather, is only whether the 
state-court opinion upset settled expectations.117 Consider, however, 
the implications of an approach to judicial decision-making that 
suggests that any time a court upsets settled ownership expectations, 
the court’s decision should be subject to a takings analysis. In Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council,118 for example, the Court ruled that a 
state law designed to prevent beach erosion created a taking when it 
rendered a landowner’s property valueless. If the Court subsequently 
overturned the Lucas decision would it, or the United States 
government, have to compensate the owner because the Court 
changed the law in a way that upset the landowner’s expectations? Or, 
if the Court reversed the line of political patronage cases holding that 
the First Amendment prevents public employers from hiring and 
firing employees on account of party affiliation,119 a change in law 
specifically advocated by Justice Scalia,120 would newly fired 
employees be able to seek constitutional redress because the 
Supreme Court upset settled expectations that they would be 
protected from patronage decisions?121 The logic of Stop the Beach 
Renourishment suggests that they should. The Justices who joined the 
Stop the Beach Renourishment opinion, I suspect, would hold that 
they should not. 
This leads to the argument that the White and Stop the Beach 
Renourishment Justices presumably really want to make—that their 
decisions are based on the Rule of Law and are therefore valid 
exercises of judicial power, while judicial decisions based on policy 
preferences are illegitimate uses of judicial power. That criticism, 
however, could be stated directly without adopting a jurisprudence 
that treats judges as inherently political actors. Furthermore, it could 
be stated more persuasively and without internal contradiction 
because, whether or not they choose to admit it, the Justices’ Judicial 
Political Realist approach undercuts the legitimacy of their own 
decisions as much as it undercuts the legitimacy of the decisions they 
condemn. There is, after all, an inherent paradox in the Court’s 
 
 117. Notably, this is how Justice Scalia framed the issue of how a taking should be 
determined in his Lucas opinion. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–32 . 
 118. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 119. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 
62 (1990). 
 120. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 96 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 121. Cf. Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (arguing that 
entitlements should be considered property). 
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adoption of the Judicial Political Realist account in that it makes the 
Court’s adoption of that model itself subject to its own critique—that 
its decision to do so is based on politics and not law. 
No doubt there are political abuses in the use of judicial power 
that can and should be curbed, but using Judicial Political Realism to 
attack those excesses falls under its own weight. Further, as discussed 
in the next section, it also causes more harm to judicial institutions 
than it potentially cures. 
V. THE DIMINISHMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW INHERENT IN THE 
JUDICIAL POLITICAL REALIST ACCOUNT 
That both White and Stop the Beach Renourishment appear to 
accept the Judicial Political Realist account of judges as political 
actors does not mean that the decision to do so is wrong. Social 
scientists, after all, have supported the Judicial Political Realist 
account with empirical evidence,122 and the rationales offered in White 
and Stop the Beach Renourishment present at least plausible accounts 
of judicial behavior. At the same time, however, the view that judges 
are political actors is not indisputably correct. There are many 
scholars, including leading judges, who vehemently contend that rules 
of law serve to constrain judicial decision-making123 and that 
responsible judges successfully separate their political views from 
their judicial decisions.124 
Nonetheless, even if the evidence is mixed, the choice between the 
two models of judicial decision-making should not be random 
selection, at least for a court. As the following subsections 
demonstrate, there are serious institutional costs imposed upon the 
judiciary by the vision of the judge as political actor that a court, if not 
a social scientist, should find especially hard to ignore. 
A. The Judicial Political Realist Account Suggests Judicial Review Is 
Inconsistent with Democratic Principles 
The first major concern inherent in the view of the judge as 
political actor is that it suggests that the power of judicial review is 
 
 122. See POSNER, supra note 1. 
 123. See, e.g., Hon. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies 
That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 
1953 (2009). 
 124. See Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology Versus Character, supra note 8. 
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inconsistent with democratic principles. The power of courts to strike 
down popularly enacted legislation (the power of judicial review) is 
premised on the notion that the courts are interpreting the law, not 
that they are pursuing their own political agendas. As Chief Justice 
John Marshall famously stated in Marbury v. Madison,125 “it is 
emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say 
what the law is.”126 If judicial decisions are based on politics and not 
law, however, the underlying rationale for granting courts the power 
of judicial review evaporates. Instead, the power simply becomes the 
power of one political body (the judiciary) to override the decisions 
of another. 
Seen in this light, there is no apparent reason to allow the courts 
to have the last word. Rather, democratic principles cut in exactly the 
opposite direction. The legislative and executive branches are 
politically accountable to the voters, while the judiciary is not. As 
such, democratic theory suggests that the decisions of the politically 
accountable branches should prevail.127 
Creative arguments have been advanced to the contrary. Professor 
Eric Posner, for example, contends that even if judicial decisions are 
based at least in part on the political bias of the rendering court, 
allowing judicial decisions to trump those of the politically 
accountable branches still serves the important purpose of providing 
another check on political action.128 To Posner, judicial review is just 
another of the many obstacles to legislative enactment provided by 
the Constitution and the legislative process. But unlike the barriers to 
enacting legislation created by bicameralism,129 presentment,130 and 
the various other veto points in the legislative process,131 judicial 
 
 125. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 126. Id. at 177. 
 127. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 134–35 (1893); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (2004). 
 128. See POSNER, supra note 42, at 855 (“[J]udicial bias (within limits) does not matter at all 
and could even be beneficial in a system, such as ours, where judges are expected to block or 
restrict government actions, including statutes and regulations, that are themselves likely to 
reflect ‘bias.’”). 
 129. U.S. CONST. art I, § 1. 
 130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3. 
 131. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
LEGISLATION 66 (2007) (noting the various “choke points” in the legislative process, such as 
legislative committee review, legislative amendment, the filibuster, etc., that can kill a bill before 
it has a chance to achieve final passage); see also Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, & Barry 
Weingast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 
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review ends the debate without the possibility of political 
compromise. It is therefore far more definitive in defeating the 
popular will than are the other countermajoritarian structures. 
Furthermore, because the Court, unlike the other branches, does not 
respond to the voters, the institution with the final say on the legality 
of political action is the institution that is the most insulated from the 
democratic process. This raises not only democratic-process concerns, 
but also the question of whether such an insulated body is informed 
enough to make the difficult political and policy determinations that 
come before it.132 
From a democratic-process perspective, then, an unelected 
judiciary having the power of judicial review is inevitably 
problematic.133 This power can be justified when the Court’s decisions 
are based on the Rule of Law, but there is little or no reason to 
authorize such power when the Court’s actions are based on a vision 
of judicial review as no more than political second-guessing.134 
B. The Judicial Political Realist Account Undermines the Court’s 
Perceived Legitimacy 
The Judicial Political Realist account also undercuts the courts’ 
perceived legitimacy. As the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey135 explained: 
[T]he Court cannot buy support for its decisions by spending 
money and, except to a minor degree, it cannot independently 
coerce obedience to its decrees. The Court’s power lies, rather, in 
its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows 
itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine 
what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands.136 
 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1994) (referring to the various veto points that occur along the 
legislative process). 
 132. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 253, 254–55 (2009). 
 133. Alexander Bickel, in his seminal book, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986), coined the phrase 
“countermajoritarian difficulty” to refer to the inherent tension between judicial review and the 
democratic process. See also, Dinh, supra note 19, at 931–32; Dimino, supra note 114, at 61. 
 134. See Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (“[F]ederal judges—
who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who 
do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the 
struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones.”). 
 135. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 136. Id. at 865. The issue before the Court in Casey was whether Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973), should be overturned. As the above-cited passage indicates, preserving the Court’s 
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Based as it is on popular perception, however, judicial legitimacy 
is inevitably strained by courts’ obligation to review the 
constitutionality of popularly enacted measures. When courts use 
their power to strike down measures in areas that excite the public’s 
interest, such as school prayer, abortion, and flag burning, among 
others, the courts’ actions can and do generate significant hostile 
public response. And there lies the problem. The courts’ duty to strike 
down popularly enacted measures places the source of the Court’s 
legitimacy—public acceptance—under constant threat.137 The judiciary 
must rely “on public sentiment to enable it to oppose public 
sentiment,”138 and it must do so in an environment where it is 
continually testing the limits of public support. 
To be sure, the meaning of judicial legitimacy is itself subject to a 
number of interpretations139 and is not always defined as strict 
adherence to an objective rule of law.140 But there is one constant 
theme: legitimacy depends on the courts’ decisions being seen as 
based on a greater principle than simply the judiciary’s imposition of 
its own political agenda.141 As Professor John Yoo writes, “only by 
acting in a manner that suggests that its decisions are the product of 
law rather than politics can the Court maintain its legitimacy.”142 There 
is no reason, after all, for people to accept judicial decisions that 
invalidate popular measures if those decisions are nothing more than 
the judiciary’s trumping of popular political preferences with political 
preferences of their own.143 Characterizing judicial decisions as 
 
legitimacy was the guiding reason that Roe was not overruled. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 845–46. 
 137. See Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 
2610–11 (2003) (referring to historical attacks on the judiciary for providing decisions that 
opposed public opinion). 
 138. Dimino, supra note 114, at 59. 
 139. See Richard Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005). 
Indeed the question of how the Court can best maintain its legitimacy has engaged some of our 
most prominent legal academic minds for decades. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 133; Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); Paul 
Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality 
of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 929, 930 (1983). 
 140. It has been argued, for example, that in order to be legitimate, a judicial decision must 
also comport with morality. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law 
Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 747 (1991). 
 141. See Dinh, supra note 19, at 931–32; Wechsler, supra note 139, at 10–20. 
 142. John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 781–82 
(2001). 
 143. There is little to suggest, for example, that a judge’s political decisions are likely to be 
superior to those of other political actors. The best argument, in that respect, is that the fact that 
judges are more insulated from the political fray than are “other” political actors means that 
their political judgments are likely to be less influenced by short-term considerations. But while 
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political thus cuts at the very heart of the reason why the public 
should perceive those decisions as legitimate. 
C. The Judicial Political Realist Account Undercuts the Constitutional 
System of Checks and Balances 
The Judicial Political Realist account also subverts any reason the 
other branches should defer to the judiciary when their own power is 
challenged. Consider United States v. Nixon,144 in which the Court, 
over a claim of executive privilege, ordered the President to turn over 
tapes to a special prosecutor, or Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,145 in which the 
Court held that a United States citizen held as an enemy combatant 
must be allowed an opportunity to contest his enemy-combatant 
designation. In both cases, the President had strong institutional 
reasons to oppose the Court’s decisions and yet in both cases the 
President acceded to the Court’s authority. 
Why, though, should an elected President defer to an unelected 
judiciary if the latter’s decision is based on no more than political or 
policy judgment? Had the President been able to characterize the 
Court’s action as merely “political” and not based on the Rule of Law, 
he would have a powerful argument for potential disobedience. He 
could assert in Nixon, for example, that he need not turn over the 
tapes because the executive branch has the political authority to 
decide what matters are protected by executive privilege and the 
political views of the Court on privilege issues should be discounted. 
In Hamdi, he could claim that a decision not to comply with the 
Court’s order could be justified because, as President, he has a far 
greater understanding of why complying with the order might prevent 
him from fulfilling his constitutional duties than does the Court. Thus, 
the President could argue, with considerable political resonance, that 
he is entitled to reject the Court’s decision because he is in a far 
better position than the Court to weigh the national security interests 
at stake in detaining suspected enemy combatants, and that 
compliance with the Court’s relatively uninformed “political” decision 
 
insulation from political pressures may lead to better results in some circumstances, it may lead 
to unrealistic decisions in others. Furthermore, even if insulation from political pressures 
provides some decisional benefits, those benefits may not outweigh the fact that a judge, whose 
primary training is legal, does not have the particularized training necessary to reach the best 
results on policy issues dealing with such matters as the environment, national security, and 
even campaign finance. 
 144. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715–16 (1974). 
 145. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004). 
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could place American lives at risk. A President taking such actions in 
today’s political climate would, of course, face enormous fallout, but if 
the perception is that the Court is only a political actor, a President 
might be able to pursue such courses with very little political cost. It is 
only because the Court’s decisions are imbued with an authority 
derived from the Rule of Law that those decisions demand respect 
from the other branches. Recharacterizing the Court’s decisions as 
merely political takes away much of the President’s (and Congress’s) 
motivation to comply and thereby threatens the constitutional system 
of checks and balances.146 
D. The Judicial Political Realist Account Fosters Judicial Political 
Activism 
At this point, those who believe that political decision-making by 
judges is a serious concern might respond that the “harms” to judicial 
institutions noted above are all to the good. If judges are essentially 
political actors, democratic values are threatened, judicial decisions 
should not be perceived as legitimate, and judicial orders need not 
merit obedience from the other branches. If the Judicial Political 
Realist account is accurate, in short, the true nature of judicial 
behavior should be exposed. 
Ironically, however, the Judicial Political Realist critique and its 
apparent adoption in White and Stop the Beach Renourishment may 
actually serve to increase judicial political activism, not curtail it. First, 
doctrinal acceptance of the model of the judge as political actor 
eliminates one of the best guards against judicial overreaching—
public criticism of the judge as acting outside her appropriate judicial 
role. In the present climate, as Professor Viet Dinh explains, public 
accusations of judicial activism have a negative connotation, the 
stigma of which serves as a check on the otherwise unaccountable 
branch.147 For this reason, criticizing judges for judicial activism serves 
to confine judicial excess by “reminding judges to perform their 
proper function as members of the judicial branch—interpreters of 
the Constitution.”148 But there is little corrective effect to be had in 
 
 146. See Martin H. Redish, Legal Realism and the Confirmation Process: A Comment on 
Professor Nagel’s Thesis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 886, 887 (1990); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability 
and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 426–27 (1996) 
(noting that the Court’s power to check the other branches depended upon it exercising judicial 
authority to expound upon existing law and not to create new law). 
 147. Dinh, supra note 19, at 939–40. 
 148. Id. at 940. 
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accusing a judge of having decided a case based upon her political 
motivations if the Supreme Court itself has concluded that political 
decision-making by courts is both acceptable and inevitable. The 
Court’s acceptance of the Judicial Political Realist account, then, 
counteracts a key incentive for judicial restraint. 
Second, and perhaps even more significantly, the Judicial Political 
Realist critique may actually encourage judges to rule based on their 
political beliefs. If political preferences are expected to influence 
judicial decision-making, there is no reason for a judge to try and 
minimize the role they play in her decisional process. That is, if a judge 
is already presumed to decide cases based on her political preferences, 
she may as well decide cases based on her political preferences. As 
Justice Kennedy argued in his Stop the Beach Renourishment 
concurrence, telling courts they have the power to make pure policy 
decisions may actually encourage them to do so.149 
Conversely, maintaining the expectation that judges should not act 
politically can serve to limit the role politics plays in judicial decision-
making. A judge faced with the professional norm that she should not 
decide cases based upon her policy preferences is likely to decide 
cases differently than if her expected behavior is to insert her political 
beliefs into her judicial function.150 Thus, even if the Judicial Political 
Realist critique is accurate in its account that political views influence 
judicial decision-making, the extent that a judge will consciously 
attempt to minimize the role political preferences play in her decision 
making will depend significantly upon the expectations placed upon 
her behavior.151 White and Stop the Beach Renourishment, however, 
 
 149. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2616 
(2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 150. See Redish, supra note 146, at 887; see generally Solum, The Virtues and Vices of 
Judging, supra note 8 (illustrating the importance of legal analysis in appellate judging, and how 
this differs from the idea of a purely political judiciary). 
 151. Sociologists have studied expectation effects in other fields, particularly in education 
and management. See, e.g., Nicole M. Kierein & Michael A. Gold, Pygmalion in Work 
Organizations: A Meta-Analysis, 21 J. ORG. BEHAV. 913 (2000); Dov Eden, Leadership and 
Expectations: Pygmalion Effects and Other Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Organizations, 3 
LEADERSHIP Q. 271 (1992). “The Pygmalion Effect,” first articulated by Robert Rosenthal and 
Lenore Jacobsen, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM: TEACHER EXPECTATIONS AND PUPILS’ 
INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT (1968), is the notion that placing greater expectations on 
people improves their subsequent performance. See also Robert P. Mosteller, Failures of the 
American Adversarial System to Protect the Innocent and Conceptual Advantages in the 
Inquisitorial Design for Investigative Fairness, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. LIT. (forthcoming 
2011) (citing Barbara O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between 
Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L. 
REV. 999 (2009) (demonstrating the effect professional expectations play in influencing 
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place expectations decidedly on the side of judges issuing politically 
influenced rulings. They are more problem than solution. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Judicial Political Realist inquiry provides an invaluable lens 
into judicial behavior. It may even serve to improve judicial decision-
making by making judges aware of predispositions that might 
unintentionally affect their decisional processes. On the other hand, 
incorporating the idea that judges are inherently political actors into 
constitutional jurisprudence damages judicial authority and 
legitimacy. The Justices in White and Stop the Beach Renourishment 
who implicitly adopted this view were no doubt concerned with 
curbing what they saw as improper political decision-making by some 
judges. The method they chose, however, does not curb judicial 
abuse—it encourages it. It does not serve the Rule of Law—it 
diminishes its authority. 
 
 
prosecutorial judgment)). 
